O NE OF THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES OF
the Reagan administration was to propose several reforms of federal health care spending. Three major components included:
• A ceiling or " cap" on federal contributions to M edicaid, such that federal medical care expenditures would be allowed to in crease only 5 percent in fiscal year 1982 and thereafter would be lim ited to increases indexed to the gross national product (G N P ) deflator.
• " Block grants" to replace current formula grant and categorical health program s, the resulting federal grant moneys being com bined into two broad blocks, one for preventive health activities and one for health services.
• A marked increase in state discretion in operating and deter m ining eligibility for and coverage under Medicaid programs, and a parallel state role in determining the use of other federal health moneys newly combined under the two block grants.
In response, the Congress passed a somewhat modified program, but one that contained very significant changes in federal health care
Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly/ Health and Society, Vol. 60, No. 1, 1982 © 1982 Milbank Memorial Fund and Massachusetts Institute of Technology 0160/1997 financing. The fixed ceiling on Medicaid was avoided in return for reduced federal payments to states and cost-saving provisions intended to keep annual M edicaid expenditures below targeted levels. Block grants were created, but exclude several key categorical programs and retain some significant federal restrictions on how states may use the funds. The net result represents substantially increased state discretion, but less than the administration had envisioned.
This paper analyzes the potential implications o f these changes for child health services. The first section describes current spending and how the new legislation will modify existing federal programs that provide or purchase child health care. Since most federal health care dollars for children are specifically targeted to low-income populations and M edicaid is overwhelmingly the source o f public spending for this group, the analysis that follows focuses on the economic char acteristics and health care needs o f Medicaid recipients and the likely effects o f spending cuts and policy shifts. The final sections examine the recent block grant changes and discuss the implications of further developments that m ight be expected in the future.
Existing Federal Programs and the New Amendments P u b lic E xp en d itu res f o r C h ild re n 's H e a lth C a re
Expenditures for children comprise both a small proportion and a low absolute amount o f federal expenditures for health care. In 1978, public expenditures for child health care were S5 .6 9 6 billion or 8.8 percent o f the total public expenditures of S65.042 billion (Fisher, 1980) . Per capita public expenditures for children were $ 8 1 .9 9 , com pared with $ 1 ,2 7 9 .5 5 in public funds expended for those 65 and over, and $2 1 8 .1 3 for those aged 19 to 64.
Medicaid accounts for the largest proportion o f public funds that are spent for children (Table 1 ). In 1978, Medicaid accounted for 55 percent o f public funds spent for children's health, although that program accounted for only 28 percent o f public expenditures for health care for all age groups and only 21 percent for those aged 65 and over. Although the aged have other sources o f public spending, Source: Fisher (1980) , Tables A and C. particularly Medicare, children receiving health care under public programs rely largely on Medicaid. A variety o f other health and health-related federal programs offer components of public support for maternal and child health care. The report o f the Select Panel for the Promotion of Child Health (1981) identified 14 programs in addition to Medicaid that provide elements of direct financial support or health service, and numerous others that support health-related activities such as nutrition education, food supplem entation, child development and daycare, special services for handicapped children, and social services. Among the relevant sources o f direct federal funding, however, by far the most significant in addition to M edicaid has been Title V o f the Social Security Act. In 1981, T itle V appropriations totaled $407 million in grants to the states for maternal and child health care and crippled children's services.
The rate o f increase in federal expenditures for child health care has not been high in recent years. Expenditures for children under all federal health care programs increased only 8 .8 percent on average between 1976 and 1978, well below the rates for the other age groups (Fisher, 1980) . For comparison, the medical care component o f the consumer price index increased on average 9 .4 percent annually over those two years, while the personal health expenditures index o f the Health Care Financing Administration (H CFA) increased 4 .3 percent annually (Gibson, 1980) . Thus, there was either a small amount of real growth in federal expenditures for health care for children, as measured by the H C FA index, or a net loss in expenditures to in flation, as measured by the consumer price index. In either case, the rate o f growth o f federal spending for health care was much lower for children than for adults and the aged.
N ot only do children account for a modest proportion o f federal health dollars, but it is also clear that the public is financing only a small component of children's health care. In feet, most expenditures for child health care are private, not public. Over 71 percent o f such expenditures ($14.2 billion o f $19-9 billion) in 1978 were private, compared with 37 percent of expenditures for health care for the aged (65 + ) (Fisher, 1980) . Direct (out-of-pocket) payment for personal health care is highest in the age group under 19, particularly for physician services. For that reason, changes in Medicaid are likely to have an effect on non-Medicaid patients as well. For example, if those physicians who do take Medicaid patients receive relatively lower payment, they will be likely to increase cross-subsidies from their non-Medicaid patients by raising charges. Since nearly 40 percent of physician payments for child medical care are out-of-pocket, this could have a direct effect on many working families as well as unemployed parents.
M edicaid. Title X I X o f the Social Security Act established a joint federal-state program to provide medical benefits to low-income fam ilies. Federal payments are based on a matching formula that is designed to account for relative differences in per capita income among states. The matching formula rewards generous state programs because total federal contributions increase as state Medicaid expenditures rise (Departm ent o f Health and Hum an Services, 1979a) .
The benefits provided under Medicaid programs are a combination o f services required by federal law and those that are permitted at a state's option. A ll states m ust provide inpatient and outpatient hospital care, other laboratory and X-ray services, physician services, and early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment (EPSDT) services for children under 21. States are allowed to restrict the scope and duration o f these basic services, and some do impose lim its such as Alabam a's ceiling o f 20 hospital days annually. From the inception of M edicaid, mandatory benefits seldom have been changed, with the exception o f E PSD T. States have increased the number o f optional benefits to a sm all extent, but these changes have had minimal effect on costs (Congressional Budget Office, 1981) .
E ligibility for M edicaid is defined by both the federal government and the states. The largest group o f children receiving Medicaid benefits are those whose families are eligible for cash assistance (welfare) under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The states determine the eligibility standards under which single parent families qualify. Generally these standards are very low (Table  2) . Children who are severely disabled and eligible for benefits under the Supplem ental Security Income (SSI) program are frequently eligible for M edicaid. In one survey that included data on 32 states, approx imately 85 percent o f SSI children received Medicaid benefits (Rymer et al., 1979) .
Children in families that meet A FD C or SSI categories but whose incomes are above the eligibility levels may also receive Medicaid if their state has elected to operate a " medically needy" program. In the 33 states with such a program , families who meet the categorical requirements may subtract their medical expenses from their total income. Once the medical expenses reach a certain level, the family then becomes eligible for Medicaid.
Another M edicaid option permits states to provide coverage to children in families that are financially eligible, whether or not they meet the categorical definitions. In that case, only the child and not the adults in the family may receive Medicaid. Twenty states have elected to provide M edicaid to children through this option. Overall, M edicaid excludes large numbers o f children, and optional benefits and eligibility criteria vary sharply from state to state. 1979 Expected if payment standard had increased at the same rate as did inflation.
Source: Rowland and Gaus (1981) . Reprinted with permission of the authors.
The Om nibus Budget Reconciliation Act o f 1981 calls for the following changes in Medicaid (P.L. 9 7 -3 5 ). A fixed level for federal spending was not enacted but payments to the states will be decreased by 3 percent in fiscal year 1982 , 4 percent in FY 1983 , and 4 .5 percent in FY 1984 with the amount o f federal matching funds that would otherwise be required. The federal reduction can be modified according to state unemployment levels, fraud and abuse recoveries, and the presence o f a hospital rate-setting program. Mark ing the first serious inroad into the "freedom o f choice" guarantees o f the M edicaid and Medicare laws are provisions that allow waivers so that states can require individuals to use particular providers under specified conditions. A previous penalty o f a 1 percent reduction in federal matching payments under A FD C if states fail to meet EPSD T standards has been repealed. M edicaid coverage for individuals aged 19-20 is no longer required, and several requirements for services for the medically needy have also been repealed.
T itle V a n d Other Programs. Enacted in 1935, Title V o f the Social Security Act remains the only federal program exclusively aimed at improving the health o f mothers and children. The program provides funds to the states to promote, improve, and deliver maternal and child health care and crippled children's services, usually via state departments o f public health.
Title V has supported maternal and child health clinics, family planning, regionalized infant care, special primary care projects, and dental care. Funds are not targeted to the poor by legislation, but usually are used to offer services in low-income and rural areas. Crip pled children's moneys often have been used via purchase o f service arrangements to provide intensive and long-term hospital and clinic care for children with selected disabilities and chronic illnesses (Select Panel, 1981) .
T itle V appropriations have risen gradually over the past decade, from $259 m illion in 1973, to $351 million in 1977, to $407 million in 1981. This trend has not proven enough to compensate for inflation in the cost o f medical care, however, so that the program 's real dollar resources in fact have diminished. Although Title V has been incor porated into the block grants described below, it is likely that the most significant change in the program to be expected in FY 1982 is the reduction in appropriation expected. At the time this paper is subm itted, the FY 1982 authorization for the new Maternal and Child Health Block (M CH ) has been set at $375 million, and actual appropriations are likely to be between the $331 million recommended by the House o f Representatives and $340 million recommended by the Senate. After adjustm ent for inflation, this appropriation level will reflect a 25 percent cut in funds.
The reduction in money available is in fact somewhat greater than would appear, because the maternal and child health block grant includes five smaller categorical programs that previously had budgets of their own. This block consolidates the following programs: maternal and child health and crippled children's services (Title V), supple mental security income for disabled children, lead-based paint poi soning, genetic disease, sudden infant death syndrome, hemophilia treatment, and adolescent pregnancy. Remaining as categorical pro gram s are those for childhood immunization, developmental disabil ities, and family planning.
For the first tim e, no T itle V moneys are earmarked for crippled children's services. Instead, the funds now can be distributed across all the program s in the block. One significant restriction on state discretion, however, is that no maternal and child health funds may be transferred to other blocks. The only reporting requirement for states is an annual report on how funds were expended, plus a report on compliance with assurances o f " quality, fairness and appropriate ness" o f expenditures. Several areas were identified as funding priorities to maintain: reducing infant mortality, preventable diseases and hand icapping conditions, and increasing maternity care, immunizations, and assessments o f services to low-income children. For every four federal dollars, three state dollars m ust be matched in the M CH block grant.
Assessing the Likely Effects M e d ic a id
To analyze the possible effects o f reduced federal Medicaid expendi tures, it is necessary to understand the current role o f the program in providing medical services to poor children. Two characteristics o f children receiving M edicaid are central-their relative poverty or wealth and their health status and needs for medical care.
Medicaid children are demonstrably poor and are unlikely to have other insurance or resources as compared with older groups (Kovar and Meny, 1981) . In fact, Medicaid eligibles have become increasingly poor in recent years. Their poverty is more severe in two senses.
First, eligibility standards for the major welfare program s, partic ularly A FD C , have not kept pace with inflation (Rowland and Gaus, 1981) . Com paring increases in welfare eligibility standards with the Consumer Price Index, we find that by 1979 only 11 states were within 90 percent or more o f their comparable 1970 standard; 25 states were at 60-89 percent; and 13 states had eligibility standards set at only 3 0 -5 9 percent o f the 1970 level (Table 2) . Thus, families have to be less well off now than previously in order to quality for A FD C. Because individuals in families receiving AFD C comprise the majority of children receiving Medicaid benefits, erosion o f the AFDC standard has caused a parallel restriction of Medicaid coverage to relatively poorer children.
Second, the poor who are eligible for A FD C receive actual payments that are often well below the eligibility standards. For example, in South Carolina, payment to a family of four with no income in 1978 was only $117 per month. The highest payments were in New York, at $476, and Hawaii, which paid $533 for an eligible family (Social Security Adm inistration, 1978) .
The failure of eligibility standards and cash payments to keep up with inflation has had the following direct results: 1 1. Even though Medicaid programs have become somewhat more generous in optional benefits (Intergovernmental Health Policy Proj ect, 1980) a lower proportion of poor children are now eligible for Medicaid than previously. All AFDC-eligible children are still covered by Medicaid programs, but A FD C criteria now include a diminishing proportion of families below the national poverty standard. In ad dition, many poor families with children do not qualify for AFDC because both parents are present in the household. Thus, Medicaid currently excludes large numbers of poor children-only 48 percent of children in families with incomes below the national poverty stan dard received Medicaid in 1980 (Kovar and Meny, 1981) .
As welfare eligibility has lagged behind inflation, the number of Medicaid recipients has decreased and would continue to decline even with present levels o f eligibility. The number o f dependent children less than 21 years o f age decreased by 1.5 million between 1976 and 1978, a decline o f 14.4 percent in just those two years (Department o f Health and H um an Services, 1980) . During those same years, the total child population in the United States declined, but by only 2.5 percent (Budetti et al., 1981) . Estimates o f the decline in the total number o f children receiving Medicaid benefits show similar declines from a peak o f 1 1 ,6 5 4 ,0 0 0 in 1976 to 1 0 ,093,000 in 1978 (De partment o f Health and Hum an Services, 1979a).
2. The pool o f indigents who are poor and uninsured has increased. Children in low-income families are unlikely to have insurance other than M edicaid, nor do they have the resources to pay for medical care.
Children under 19 represent 38.4 percent of the uninsured indi viduals in the United States, although they account for only 32.8 percent o f the population (Congressional Budget Office, 1979) . Over half (58 percent) o f the uninsured children were in families with incomes less than $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 in 1976, so that they were unable to selfinsure in any meaningful way (Congressional Budget Office, 1979) . In 1977-1978, there were 8 m illion uninsured children under the age o f 18 (Department o f Health and Human Services, 1979b).
Such declines in M edicaid eligibility and increases in the number o f uninsured have serious implications for child health care. W ithout M edicaid, other insurance, or other financial resources, children are likely to decrease their health care utilization. This sensitivity o f child health services to price is demonstrated by three types o f evidence. First, utilization o f health care services by poor children now ap proximates that o f the nonpoor but did not begin to do so until after enactment o f the M edicaid program. Aday et al. (1980) report that, overall, 87 percent o f the children in the United States ages 1-5 saw a physician in 1976; the children ranged from 97 percent of those in families with high incomes to 78 percent o f those in low-income families. They noted sim ilar ratios for children ages 6-17 in house holds o f different income status. In 1963, before the enactment of M edicaid, however, the differences in utilization were much greater: only 52 percent o f the younger children and 41 percent o f the older group in low-income families saw a physician in the previous year, compared with 87 and 70 percent, respectively, in the high-income group. Other national studies have also confirmed the increased use o f health services by poor children since enactment o f M edicaid (Orr and M iller, 1981; Madans and Kleinman, 1980) . Sim ilar findings have been reported recently from a microstudy of children in the Flint, M ichigan, metropolitan area (Gortmaker, 1981) . As a greater proportion o f children in poverty and near-poverty house holds enrolled in M edicaid between 1973 and 1977, the previous gap in the utilization o f health services by children in different income groups narrowed substantially. U sing multivariate analytic techniques to control for variations in socioeconomic and health status confirmed the role o f M edicaid in increasing two important areas o f health care, total physician contacts and the use o f preventive services.
Second, although children on Medicaid continue to demonstrate signs o f difficulty in obtaining access to regular care by office-based physicians (" mainstream medicine"), they do identify some regular source o f care about as frequently as privately insured children (Kovar and Meny, 1981) . Children with no insurance, however, are almost twice as likely as children on Medicaid to have no regular source of care. The presence of a usual source o f care is important, because children without a regular source o f care are much less likely to get care when it is appropriate than children with such a source (De partment o f Health and Human Services, 1979b; Aday et a l., 1980). Third, there is direct evidence that the use o f physician services is sensitive to increases in the out-of-pocket share o f the cost o f care (Scitovsky and M cCall, 1977) . Introduction o f a 25 percent copayment requirement substantially reduced the use o f health services by the population served by a large multispecialty group practice in California.
Taken together, these studies demonstrate the high likelihood that poor children removed from the Medicaid rolls would use far less medical care than they currently do. This result in itself is o f concern for reasons o f equity, but is even more serious in its implications for child health because o f the types o f services being provided by Med icaid and the relatively great health care needs o f poor children.
As mentioned above, Medicaid has been shown to have increased the use o f preventive services and physician contacts, and recent studies report that Medicaid children show no evidence o f overuse o f emer gency facilities (Gortmaker, 1981; Weitzman et al., 1980) . A par ticularly relevant finding by the University o f Chicago's long-term study (Aday et al., 1980:196) (Kovar and Meny, 1981) . These findings strongly support the argument that program changes requiring persons now eligible for Medicaid to purchase their own care, out of pocket, will decrease the use o f basic, not unnecessary, health care for children.
Such reductions in the utilization o f basic services would be very significant because children receiving Medicaid are needy in a medical as well as an economic sense. Although Medicaid has substantially reduced the gap in the use o f health care services between income groups, low-income children and expectant mothers still experience significant barriers to receiving medical care relative to those in higher income groups, as measured by the University of Chicago group's study o f health care needs and services (Aday et al., 1980) . This gap between need and services persists because poor children have demonstrably greater health care needs than other children. H igher infant m ortality rates among the poor are well known and have persisted even as overall improvement has occurred in all income groups (D utton, 1981) . D ata from the National Health Interview Survey demonstrate lower health status for poor children as measured by parents' perception, restricted activity days, loss of time in school, days o f hospitalization, and lim itation o f activity due to chronic conditions (D utton, 1981; Kovar and Meny, 1981) . Similarly, the Health and N utrition Examination Survey conducted in 1 971-1974 demonstrated a clear relation between low income and presence of decayed teeth or other conditions requiring dental care (Kovar and Meny, 1981) .
The association between low income and poor health status in childhood is clear. Nevertheless, the causal relation has been chal lenged by Grossm an et al. (1980) , Edwards and Grossman (1979) , and others at the National Bureau o f Economic Research. In a pre liminary report, they point out that the health status advantage en joyed by higher-income children diminishes when other variables are held constant. In particular, for certain measures the level o f education attained by the child's parents (usually mothers) accounts for ap proximately the same proportion o f the health differential as does income.
These intriguing results by Grossman, Edwards, and colleagues are yet to be confirmed by other investigators. Moreover, their use o f old (1963) (1964) (1965) data and inclusion o f some health status indicators of questionable significance ( e .g ., uncorrected vision, parental assessment o f child's anxiety level) clearly call for more current and reformulated studies. Their tentative findings do, however, suggest an approach to teasing out the factors that produce the substantial gap in health status between children in different income groups. Until those other factors are both identified and ameliorated, programs such as Medicaid remain as a necessary means to meet the increased health care needs associated with poverty.
One major area o f discretion with particular importance for children was requested by the National Governors' Association (1981a) and was met by the repeal of the penalty for failure to meet standards o f the Early Periodic Screening, D iagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) program under M edicaid. There have been serious concerns about the E PSD T program 's effectiveness, but its emphasis on preventive care for children is not likely to be helped by this move if it appears to signal a lack o f priority for the program. That is, with increasing stresses on Medicaid budgets, it should be recognized that giving states full discretion in spending E PSD T funds across age categories m ight well result in a marked reduction in total spending on behalf o f children. Such an action m ight well mean a reduction in spending for preventive and diagnostic services.
Many states have expressed interest in having the right to be "pru dent purchasers'' o f medical care with state funds. The principal effect o f this reform thus far has been to reduce the freedom-of-choice requirements by the recently enacted liberal waiver provisions to broaden the situations in which states may contract with a limited number o f selected providers for indigent care.
One attractive feature o f the "prudent purchaser" approach is that it would offer an opportunity for direct economic competition in the health care sector. States or other units of government would be able to conduct genuine negotiations and let bids for medical care services. Presumably, this could lead to increased efficiency in many areas. A major lim iting factor, however, is the need to have enough money available to have at least some qualified providers willing to negotiate to provide the care. Thus, severe cutbacks in federal and state M edi caid funds would reduce the usefulness of "prudent purchaser" provisions.
Evidence is beginning to accumulate that legal recognition o f lim ited providers would not necessarily encompass a significant departure from the ad hoc situation in many states. In California, for example, a lim ited number o f hospitals provide the vast majority of all Medicaid care (Myers, 1979) . Sim ilarly, physician participation in the Medicaid program nationwide is not high and there has never been a requirement that all physicians participate and genuinely guarantee freedom of choice. In addition, because o f restrictive provisions o f the Social Security Act, the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act, and regulations under both program s, participation by H M Os as providers o f M edicaid services has been lim ited, a situation addressed in part by the 1981 amendments.
For children, the "prudent purchaser" approach to state discretion has a number o f significant implications. For example, pediatricians provide about one-third o f the care received by all persons under age 22. In a survey o f 13 states that account for well over one-half o f all M edicaid spending, Davidson (1981a Davidson ( , 1981b and Davidson and Perloff (1980) found that pediatricians generally have very high rates of participation in the Medicaid program. That is, 85 percent of pe diatricians in those states were participating to some degree in Med icaid and the vast majority o f pediatricians who were accepting any new patients into their practice were, in fact, accepting all Medicaid patients who applied. Since many pediatricians are not members of organized practice settings that m ight compete effectively for Medicaid contracts, one result o f a "prudent purchaser" approach m ight be a reduction in participation by private physicians. To avoid such a trend, "prudent purchaser" activities by the states m ight well be separated into physician and hospital components in order to maximize the individual physician participation while m inim izing the high-cost hospital role.
B lo ck G r a n ts
In addition to changes in M edicaid, the move to block grant fundingand in particular the creation o f the T itle V Maternal and Child Health block grant-has a variety o f potentially serious consequences for the extent and quality o f child health care. The new federal approach has two aspects that deserve separate consideration. First, it will involve a substantial reduction in the total amount appropriated for maternal and child health and crippled children's services, as much as 25 percent in FY 1982. This reduction comes at a time when, as mentioned earlier, the T itle V program already has begun to fall behind in real dollar appropriations and when those states who have overmatched the federal contribution are going to find it hard to continue to do so.
T itle V funding reductions m ust be considered jointly with cutbacks in M edicaid. Most states serve many o f the same children in both program s, or rely on the joint implementation of the two programs to provide essential services in areas with sizable low-income popu lations. It is clear that the m ultiplier effects o f simultaneous reductions in M edicaid and Title V are the most significant problem the states m ust face. Implications for the adequacy of care are likely to be very serious, regardless o f how ingenious state authorities are in admin istering reduced funds. These cutbacks are likely to translate into various eligibility and benefit restrictions under state maternal and child health and crippled children's programs, and thinner staffing, both medical and administrative, at all levels.
The second aspect o f block grant funding is increased state discretion in allocation, administration, and monitoring o f Title V. In particular, money will now be fungible across the maternal and child health (M CH ) and crippled children's (CC) components, as well as the pre viously categorical programs now included in the block. The lessened, but still substantial, constraints on state behavior suggest the follow ing results are likely:
1. State governments will worry a great deal at first about how to adm inister the new grants, and what they imply for organizational charts within umbrella human services agencies. In most states, how ever, T itle V programs will continue to enjoy a relatively low status, and T itle V program managers and clients will not compete well with other factions for marginal resources beyond the program funds them selves. In com peting for lim ited Title V funds, crippled children's constituencies who focus on one or more specific diseases may be in a somewhat better position than the diffuse constituency of low-income mothers and children who use M CH programs. But these effects are apt to be small in comparison with the net effect on staffing and scope of services resulting from across-the-board reductions in program funding.
2. Reporting requirements to federal authorities are not likely to be much more or less burdensome, or informative, than in the recent past. State expenditures o f T itle V moneys have never been especially well documented, largely because from its inception the program has been seen as a mechanism for discretionary formula grant support to the states. The new block grant legislation requires a biennial audit to ensure that funds are not misused, but this function is entirely under state control. Otherwise, the new law calls only for minimal planning and reporting procedures, which are likely to be taken seriously by only a few states.
3. Increased discretionary authority may well accentuate the already considerable differences of quality and commitment among state Title V programs. Those states with relatively strong Title V efforts also tend to be those that are more affluent in general, have stronger and more capable human services staff, tend to document the use of funds more fully, and are more attuned to the joint implementation of various related program s and policies. Conversely, those states whose current efforts are most lim ited tend to be the same ones with limited state and local revenue bases, low commitment to public support of health services, lim ited staff capability in human services agencies and state legislatures, and poorest track records in data collection, analysis, and program evaluation. More state discretion may allow further improvement by those agencies that are already administering effective and efficient program s, but may lead to new problems in agencies whose current policies have occasioned concern.
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Im p lic atio n s o f O ther Proposed Reform s in f e d e r a l Sp en d in g f o r C h ild re n 's H e a lth C a re
There is a good reason to believe that the proposals to cap or otherwise fix a lim it on the federal contribution to M edicaid, and to increase state discretion in the management of programs even further, will be pursued in future years by the administration. President Reagan has " vowed to go 'back and back and back' to Congress to untie some of the block grant strings attached by the Democrats and to block some of the programs that were left categorical." The president has characterized the changes to date as but a step " leading to the day when [the States] will have not only the responsibility . . . but . . . the tax sources now usurped by W ashington returned . . . , ending that round trip of the people's money to W ashington and back, minus a carrying charge" (National Health Council, 1981:9) . Pressures for further modification o f federal health efforts will come principally from the values underlying the administration's proposals to date, but will also flow from concerns over the inadequacies of existing programs. As documented in the previous sections, although many inequities have been greatly relieved, there are still a large number of poor who are not covered and for whom a wide range of necessary services are not provided. The costs of meeting those needs are so great and fiscal constraints have been so tight at every layer o f government that the 96th Congress under President Carter was not willing to extend Medicaid coverage beyond the present levels. Sim ilarly, although clearly responsible for major advances in maternal and child health services, Title V programs have suffered from a variety of structural administrative and fiscal limitations (Select Panel, 1981) . Proponents o f changes designed to meet additional health care needs will continue to point out that extensive funding cutbacks without corresponding changes in the delivery system and reimbursement methods would further reduce the availability and use o f needed medical care services by poor children and would therefore be worse than the status quo.
The major components of the remaining proposals-a Medicaid cap, block grants without strings, and increased state discretion-are not necessarily linked in design. Nevertheless, each proposal would clearly interact with the others if passed-e .g ., unfettered block grants would have more significance for states under a Medicaid cap than under a continuing federal matching formula. In the coming years, the Congress may well choose to enact some variations, or only additional aspects o f those proposals, or to make no further changes at all.
Placing a ceiling on the federal contribution of Medicaid would eliminate the current incentive for states to increase spending in order to maximize federal m atching dollars. Simultaneously, it would in crease the states' existing incentive to use Medicare resources whenever possible. U sin g a federal M edicaid cap to reduce the annual real-dollar federal share o f state programs would cause states to further emphasize the cost-cutting responses now available to them: to place lim its on mandatory benefits, eliminate optional benefits, decrease dollar thresh olds or otherwise restrict eligibility, decrease payment or reimburse ment rates, and attem pt to increase the efficiency of the programs (Montgomery Securities, 1981; National Governors' Association, 1981a; Holahan et a l., 1977; Intergovernmental Health Policy Proj ect, 1981) .
Creating unfettered block grants, to replace the recently enacted ones and to incorporate the remaining categorical health programs, m ight mean the elimination o f many child health programs. Under that approach the funds would be generally available to states to spend for a wide range o f health services and preventive health activities for all age groups, resulting in less targeting to specific maternal and child health objectives.
Finally, further increasing state discretion and control over federal health dollars could have several different results. On the one hand, states could develop innovative programs for delivery of services to the indigent and m ight correct many current inequities. On the other hand, the simultaneous reduction of federal direction and funding could worsen existing inequities among states and undercut much of the progress o f recent years.
One clear direction for future proposals will be to provide increases in state discretion over health program expenditures. The areas of state flexibility to be stressed by the administration generally reflect the approach favored by the National Governors' Association (N G A ) (1981a), the N ational Association o f Counties (N ACo), and the N a tional Conference o f State Legislatures (NCSL). These groups have long advocated a marked increase in state discretion to manage and spend M edicaid moneys. They do not, however, favor a complete ceiling on federal participation, although they have suggested capping the long-term care component alone. These groups also tend to favor broader state discretion to spend formula grant moneys and greater state access to categorical program funds, but they are becoming increasingly aware o f the problems o f visible accountability for pro gram cutbacks.
Legislative developments in the past year have prom pted reconsid eration by many states o f their original enthusiasm for block grants. This was brought about by the combination o f less discretionary authority over funds than had been expected, very substantial funding cuts, and the realization that the new block grant mode renders federal health moneys more vulnerable politically to further cuts than when allocated categorically. In a recent m eeting, the National Governors' Association (1981b) adopted a resolution refusing to endorse any further cuts in the block grants; the text acknowledges the new vulnerability and reflects second thoughts at a time when the Reagan adm inistration is about to look again to domestic programs for a second round o f budget reductions.
Another major area o f Medicaid discretion sought by the states is to have the prerogative o f requiring copayment by categorical eligibles for mandatory services as well as for optional services. One serious issue regarding copayment concerns keeping " m inim al" copayments m inim al in fact. Given the very lim ited resources o f the population group now receiving Medicaid services, even a seemingly modest copayment requirement could be significant enough to severely reduce utilization o f needed services. U nlike the situation with adults over age 6 5 , children receiving Medicaid are unlikely to have other in surance and are unlikely to have the resources to purchase private insurance for first-dollar m edi-gap coverage. Thus, the role o f copay ments in M edicaid needs to be differentiated from that o f copayments in Medicare.
Institution o f copayments has been clearly linked to decreased uti lization rates, which, as noted above, may mean reduced use o f pre ventive and primary care. I f so, the result m ight well be a need for more intensive and expensive care at a later stage o f illness or a higher level o f disability in the population. Children would also be affected disproportionately in sim ple dollar terms by a fixed copayment rate (compared with a percentage-based copayment) because child health care charges are generally lower than those for sim ilar services for adults (Kasper et al., 1980) .
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Physician fees under Medicaid are generally well below market rates defined by Medicare rates or charges. This is the single most important determinant of physician participation in M edicaid, although other factors such as coverage of the medically needy and the scope of benefits provided are also highly significant (Davidson, 1981a) . Thus, allowing states freedom to manipulate physician rates when they are convinced that m axim izing primary-care physician participation in Medicaid would reduce expenditures could increase office-based phy sician participation.
The implications of expanding purchase of service agreements and rate-setting under Medicaid are also significant for hospital care, in particular the care provided in the nation's children's hospitals. Chil dren's hospitals typically have a higher proportion of Medicaid reim bursement than other hospitals, meaning that they are more vulnerable to changes in eligibility, scope of benefits, and rates under the program (A .D . Little, 1978) . These hospitals often provide a very significant percentage of tertiary care for children with selected conditions in an entire region, and some offer a full range of services, including primary care, to low-income children in their immediate communities.
If services are to be maintained, Medicaid cutbacks will force in creasing cross-subsidies of low-income patients from private sources. Alternatively, children's hospitals will increasingly have to turn Med icaid business away, being able to generate sufficient revenues only by lim iting access to a more affluent clientele. Purchase of service arrangements offers no solution to this problem if negotiated reim bursement levels for hospital care are so low that children's hospitals cannot participate. Moreover, to the extent that indigency rates in crease and cause a greater burden of bad hospital debt, privately incorporated children's hospitals will continue to have less recourse than public hospitals to direct local or state subsidies as compensation. Thus an unexpected consequence of federal cutbacks may be to reduce the private sector's role in providing child health care and increase the burden on county hospitals and publicly operated teaching facilities.
Conclusion
As the Reagan adm inistration and the 97th Congress move to reduce federal spending across a wide range of social services and programs, one m ight question the reasons for particular concern over child health care. To many, particularly with first-hand experience in the delivery o f child health services, the reasons are self-evident, i.e ., to ensure that our ability to relieve pain and suffering, avoid unnecessary deaths, and help children achieve their maximum potential does not decline. Beyond the individual level the arguments fall into three broad cat egories: child health as a social investment, the political vulnerability o f children, and the need for specific health services.
There is a clear societal value in healthy children. Health is of importance in determining school performance and behavior, and may seriously affect future employment. Thus, efforts that improve the health of children are, in a very real sense, a long-term national investment that will pay important social dividends.
The importance of this social investment will increase as demo graphic trends change the age distribution o f the American population so that there will be fewer children relative to other age groups (the elderly in particular). That means we will need more productivity per child, or at least fewer children who are nonproductive.
Because health care and good health status are necessary precon ditions for many realms of achievement, health should have a high priority among the realms of policy toward young children. To the degree that early investment is preemptive of later problems, it not only increases productivity but also saves the society money. Present evidence allows this point to be applied conclusively to only a limited range of health conditions and treatments, such as vaccination against poliomyelitis. Nevertheless, there are many who believe this argument is also true of a number of health interventions, even if their exact contribution is difficult to document. In particular, there is impressive evidence that maternal and child health care; policies in family plan ning, prenatal care, delivery and postnatal care; and early health interventions for special needs all make a difference for child health (Select Panel, 1981) . The relative value of such an investment with proven return is great, among the choices open to society, and thus warrants special attention.
Common to each o f the underlying reasons for promoting child health is a recognition that children will always be a constituency in need of proxy representation. Childrens issues will always be debated and decided-or even neglected and made worse-by adults. This political vulnerability of child issues has several important ramifications.
Unlike most other industrialized countries, the United States has had no consistent, long-term national child health policy, and no major adm inistrative structure in the federal government to implement such a policy. In particular, the financing of health care services predominantly through employment-related insurance and Medicare for the aging has evolved a system that pays little deliberate attention to the needs o f children. As a result it should not be surprising that our system creates more incentives for high-technology, specialized acute care o f the elderly than for preventive or primary care services for children. Attem pts to assist children are fragmented, sporadic, and take place in the absence of an overall context or well-established sense of priorities, and may suffer disproportionately in times o f fiscal cutbacks and program consolidation.
Children m ust rely on others as advocates of their needs. Their best interests are represented by parents and public officials in some cases, but the interests of other groups often tend to come first. The needs of children-because they seem less urgent, have a higher ratio of preventive to acute care, are less appropriately concentrated in the hospital and tertiary care sectors, and are represented by diffuse rather than concentrated interest groups-may be put at the end of the queue for public resources when cutbacks and consolidations take place.
Even some o f the most rudimentary and uncomplicated health needs for mothers and children are not being met by the present service system. M ajor progress has been made in recent years, but the health care needs o f many adolescent, black, poor, inner-city and rural, chronically ill, and other children, as well as the health care needs of pregnant women, are not adequately served (Budetti et al., 1981) . This situation is particularly perplexing for at least two reasons. First, a great deal is known about what those health care needs are and what long-term benefits result from providing specific preventive, diag nostic, and therapeutic medical and support services. In addition, the persistence o f a large body o f unmet needs is in marked contrast to the continually expanding supply of pediatricians and the continuing increases in expenditures for medical care services. The basic issue that emerges is the importance of looking carefully as our present health care system is modified, so that the financial programs and Peter P . B u a c :::, j f M -r n^ jl i ------------------incentives and the m ix o f practitioners that result will provide at least the m inim um necessary for all children, and not create additional areas o f unmet needs. The recent developments discussed in this paper have refocused the long-standing concern for child health. These shifts in the locus of governance and funding cutbacks have serious ramifications for child health programs and policies that have been evolving over the past 15 to 45 years. For example, the extensive work of the Select Panel for the Promotion of Child Health was carried on under a mandate from the 95 th Congress to develop a comprehensive national plan for achieving specific goals with respect to the promotion o f health status o f children and expectant mothers. Now , those who created this mandate and to whom the panel was to report are largely out of power. The result is a need to develop new mechanisms to maintain and expand on the child health gains made in the last decade in a new decade o f reduced spending and federal direction.
The change in political atmosphere has created a fear that new policies m ight erode the progress o f the past rather than correct the deficiencies o f generally highly successful programs. Some fears are reasonably well grounded. There is evidence, for example, suggesting that block grants will increase administrative control o f state health agencies over local public health departments (DeFriese et al., 1981) . This has led one former state health director to decry the current shifts o f power as " dangerous" and to assert that local governments reflect " a broad spectrum of unreadiness-even inability-to undertake the sort o f rigorous administration of public health services needed to make the 'm odel' work" (Tilson, 1981 (Tilson, :1103 .
To some degree, however, current fears are as much a manifestation o f differences of political philosophy as of relevant empirical evidence. Certainly at least some of the advocates of the new approach genuinely believe that child health interests will be served better through state and local than through federal control, and blame the shortcomings of existing programs on the inefficiency of large central governments. W hat seems most likely, however, is that the new order will prove far less important than the magnitude of federal fiscal reductions. Increased state discretion in operating Medicaid and maternal and child health programs can hardly be expected to compensate for very great federal funding cutbacks, and resolution of the underlying phil osophical debate will be a trivial concern in comparison with the practical realities caused by far less federal spending for health programs.
